especially because no concept can be fully adequate to them as internal intuitions. The poet ventures to realize to sense, rational ideas of invisible beings, the kingdom of the blessed, hell, eternity, creation, etc.; or even if he deals with things of which there are examples in experience—e.g. death, envy and all vices, also love, fame, and the like—he tries, by means of imagination, which emulates the play of reason in its quest after a maximum, to go beyond the limits of experience and to present them to sense with a completeness of which there is no example in nature. This is properly speaking the art of the poet, in which the faculty of aesthetical ideas can manifest itself in its entire strength. But this faculty, considered in itself, is properly only a talent of the imagination.

If now we place under a concept a representation of the imagination belonging to its presentation, but which occasions in itself more thought than can ever be comprehended in a definite concept and which consequently aesthetically enlarges the concept itself in an unbounded fashion, the imagination is here creative, and it brings the faculty of intellectual ideas (the reason) into movement; i.e. by a representation more thought (which indeed belongs to the concept of the object) is occasioned than can in it be grasped or made clear.

§ 56. REPRESENTATION OF THE ANTINOMY OF TASTE. The first commonplace of taste is contained in the proposition, with which every tasteless person proposes to avoid blame: everyone has his own taste. That is as much as to say that the determining ground of this judgment is merely subjective (gratification or grief), and that the judgment has no right to the necessary assent of others.

The second commonplace invoked even by those who admit for judgments of taste the right to speak with validity for everyone is: there is no disputing about taste. That is as much as to say that the determining ground of a judgment of taste may indeed be objective, but that it cannot be reduced to definite concepts; and that consequently about the judgment itself nothing can be decided by proofs, although much may rightly be contested. For contesting [quarrelling] and disputing [controversy] are doubtless the same in this, that, by means of the mutual opposition of judgments they seek to produce their accordace, but different in that the latter hopes to bring this about according to definite concepts as determining grounds, and consequently assumes objective concepts as grounds of the judgment. But where this is regarded as impracticable, controversy is regarded as alike impracticable.

We easily see that, between these two commonplaces, there is a proposition wanting which, though it has not passed into a proverb, is yet familiar to everyone, viz. there may be a quarrel about taste (although there can be no controversy). But this proposition involves the contradictory of the former one. For wherever quarrelling is permissible, there must be a hope of mutual reconciliation; and consequently we can count on grounds of our judgment that have not merely private validity, and therefore are not merely subjective. And to this the proposition, everyone has his own taste, is directly opposed.
There emerges therefore in respect of the principle of taste the following antinomy:

(1) Thesis. The judgment of taste is not based upon concepts, for otherwise it would admit of controversy (would be determinable by proofs).

(2) Antithesis. The judgment of taste is based on concepts, for otherwise, despite its diversity, we could not quarrel about it (we could not claim for our judgment the necessary assent of others).

§ 57. SOLUTION OF THE ANTINOMY OF TASTE. There is no possibility of removing the conflict between these principles that underlie every judgment of taste (which are nothing else than the two peculiarities of the judgment of taste exhibited above in the Analytic), except by showing that the concept to which we refer the object in this kind of judgment is not taken in the same sense in both maxims of the aesthetical judgment. This twofold sense or twofold point of view is necessary to our transcendental judgment, but also the illusion which arises from the confusion of one with the other is natural and unavoidable.

The judgment of taste must refer to some concept; otherwise it could make absolutely no claim to be necessarily valid for everyone. But it is not therefore capable of being proved from a concept, because a concept may be either determinable or in itself undetermined and undeterminable. The concepts of the understanding are of the former kind; they are determinable through predicates of sensible intuition which can correspond to them. But the transcendental rational concept of the supersensible, which lies at the basis of all sensible intuition, is of the latter kind, and therefore cannot be theoretically determined further.

Now the judgment of taste is applied to objects of sense, but not with a view of determining a concept of them for the understanding; for it is not a cognitive judgment. It is thus only a private judgment, in which a singular representation intuitively perceived is referred to the feeling of pleasure, and so far would be limited as regards its validity to the individual judging. The object is for me an object of satisfaction; by others it may be regarded quite differently—everyone has his own taste.

Nevertheless there is undoubtedly contained in the judgment of taste a wider reference of the representation of the object (as well as of the subject), whereon we base an extension of judgments of this kind as necessary for everyone. At the basis of this there must necessarily be a concept somewhere, though a concept which cannot be determined through intuition. But through a concept of this sort we know nothing, and consequently it can supply no proof for the judgment of taste. Such a concept is the mere pure rational concept of the supersensible which underlies the object (and also the subject judging it), regarded as an object of sense and thus as phenomenal. For if we do not admit such a reference, the claim of the judgment of taste to universal validity would not hold good. If the concept on which it is based were only a mere confused concept of the understanding, like that of perfection, with
which we could bring the sensible intuition of the beautiful into correspon-
dence, it would be at least possible in itself to base the judgment of taste on
proofs, which contradicts the thesis.

But all contradiction disappears if I say: the judgment of taste is based
on a concept (viz. the concept of the general ground of the subjective purpo-
siveness of nature for the judgment); from which, however, nothing can be
known and proved in respect of the object, because it is in itself undeter-
minable and useless for knowledge. Yet at the same time and on that very
account the judgment has validity for everyone (though, of course, for each
only as a singular judgment immediately accompanying his intuition), because
its determining ground lies perhaps in the concept of that which may be
regarded as the supersensible substrate of humanity.

The solution of an antinomy only depends on the possibility of showing
that two apparently contradictory propositions do not contradict each other in
fact, but that they may be consistent, although the explanation of the possi-
ibility of their concept may transcend our cognitive faculties. That this illusion
is natural and unavoidable by human reason, and also why it is so and remains
so, although it ceases to deceive after the analysis of the apparent contradic-
tion, may be thus explained.

In the two contradictory judgments we take the concept on which the
universal validity of a judgment must be based in the same sense, and yet we
apply to it two opposite predicates. In the thesis we mean that the judgment of
taste is not based upon determinate concepts, and the antithesis that the judg-
ment of taste is based upon a concept, but an indeterminate one (viz. of the
supersensible substrate of phenomena). Between these two there is no con-
tradiction.

We can do nothing more than remove this conflict between the claims
and counterclaims of taste. It is absolutely impossible to give a definite objec-
tive principle of taste in accordance with which its judgments could be
derived, examined, and established, for then the judgment would not be one
of taste at all. The subjective principle, viz. the indefinite idea of the super-
sensible in us, can only be put forward as the sole key to the puzzle of this fac-
ulty whose sources are hidden from us; it can be made no further intelligible.

The proper concept of taste, that is of a merely reflective aesthetical
judgment, lies at the basis of the antinomy here exhibited and adjusted. Thus
the two apparently contradictory principles are reconciled—both can be true,
which is sufficient. If, on the other hand, we assume, as some do, pleasantness
as the determining ground of taste (on account of the singularity of the rep-
resentation which lies at the basis of the judgment of taste) or, as others will
have it, the principle of perfection (on account of the universality of the
same), and settle the definition of taste accordingly, then there arises an anti-
mony which it is absolutely impossible to adjust except by showing that both
the contrary (not merely contradictory) propositions are false. And this would
prove that the concept on which they are based is self-contradictory. Hence we
see that the removal of the antinomy of the aesthetical judgment takes a
course similar to that pursued by the critique in the solution of the antinomies of pure theoretical reason. And thus here, as also in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, antinomies force us against our will to look beyond the sensible and to seek in the supersensible the point of union for all our *a priori* faculties, because no other expedient is left to make our reason harmonious with itself.

§ 59. OF BEAUTY AS THE SYMBOL OF MORALITY. Intuitions are always required to establish the reality of our concepts. If the concepts are empirical, the intuitions are called examples. If they are pure concepts of understanding, the intuitions are called schemata. If we desire to establish the objective reality of rational concepts, i.e. of ideas, on behalf of theoretical cognition, then we are asking for something impossible, because absolutely no intuition can be given which shall be adequate to them.

All hypotyposis (presentation, *subjectio sub aspectum*), or sensible illustration, is twofold. It is either schematical, when to a concept comprehended by the understanding the corresponding intuition is given, or it is symbolical. In the latter case, to a concept only thinkable by the reason, to which no sensible intuition can be adequate, an intuition is supplied with which accords a procedure of the judgment analogous to what it observes in schematism, i.e. merely analogous to the rule of this procedure, not to the intuition itself, consequently to the form of reflection merely and not to its content.

There is a use of the word symbolical that has been adopted by modern logicians which is misleading and incorrect, i.e. to speak of the symbolical mode of representation as if it were opposed to the intuitive, for the symbolical is only a mode of the intuitive. The latter (the intuitive, that is), may be divided into the schematical and symbolical modes of representation. Both are hypotyposes, i.e. presentations (exhibitions), not mere characterizations or designations of concepts by accompanying sensible signs which contain nothing belonging to the intuition of the object and only serve as a means for reproducing the concepts, according to the law of association of the imagination, and consequently in a subjective point of view. These are either words or visible (algebraical, even mimetical) signs, as mere expressions for concepts.  

All intuitions which we supply to concepts *a priori* are therefore either schemata or symbols, of which the former contain direct, the latter indirect, presentations of the concept. The former do this demonstratively; the latter by means of an analogy (for which we avail ourselves even of empirical intuitions) in which the judgment exercises a double function, first applying the concept to the object of a sensible intuition, and then applying the mere rule of the reflection made upon that intuition to a quite different object of which the first is only the symbol. Thus a monarchical state is represented by a living body if it is governed by national laws, and by a mere machine (like a hand mill) if governed by an individual absolute will; but in both cases only symbolically. For between a despotic state and a hand mill there is, to be sure, no similarity; but there is a similarity in the rules according to which we reflect upon
these two things and their causality. This matter has not been sufficiently analyzed hitherto, for it deserves a deeper investigation; but this is not the place to linger over it. Our language [i.e. German] is full of indirect presentations of this sort, in which the expression does not contain the proper schema for the concept, but merely a symbol for reflection. Thus the words ground (support, basis), to depend (to be held up from above), to flow from something (instead of, to follow), substance (as Locke expresses it, the support of accidents), and countless others are not schematic but symbolical hypotheses and expressions for concepts, not by means of a direct intuition, but only an analogy with it, i.e. by the transference of reflection upon an object of intuition to a quite different concept to which perhaps an intuition can never directly correspond. If we are to give the name of “cognition” to a mere mode of representation (which is quite permissible if the latter is not a principle of the theoretical determination of what an object is in itself, but of the practical determination of what the idea of it should be for us and for its purposive use), then all our knowledge of God is merely symbolical; and he who regards it as schematical, along with the properties of understanding, will, etc., which only establish their objective reality in beings of this world, falls into anthropomorphism, just as he who gives up every intuitive element falls into deism, by which nothing at all is cognized, not even in a practical point of view.

Now I say the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good, and that it is only in this respect (a reference which is natural to every man and which every man postulates in others as a duty) that it gives pleasure with a claim for the agreement of everyone else. By this the mind is made conscious of a certain ennoblment and elevation above the mere sensibility to pleasure received through sense, and the worth of others is estimated in accordance with a like maxim of their judgment. That is the intelligible to which, as pointed out in the preceding paragraph, taste looks, with which our higher cognitive faculties are in accord, and without which a downright contradiction would arise between their nature and the claims made by taste. In this faculty the judgment does not see itself, as in empirical judging, subjected to a heteronomy of empirical laws; it gives the law to itself in respect of the objects of so pure a satisfaction, just as the reason does in respect of the faculty of desire. Hence, both on account of this inner possibility in the subject and of the external possibility of a nature that agrees with it, it finds itself to be referred to something within the subject as well as without him, something which is neither nature nor freedom, but which yet is connected with the supersensible ground of the latter. In this supersensible ground, therefore, the theoretical faculty is bound together in unity with the practical in a way which, though common, is yet unknown. We shall indicate some points of this analogy, while at the same time we shall note the differences.

1. The beautiful pleases immediately (but only in reflective intuition, not, like morality, in its concept). 2. It pleases apart from any interest (the morally good is indeed necessarily bound up with an interest, though not
with one which precedes the judgment upon the satisfaction, but with one which is first of all produced by it. (3) The freedom of the imagination (and therefore the sensibility of our faculty) is represented in judging the beautiful as harmonious with the conformity to law of the understanding (in the moral judgment the freedom of the will is thought as the harmony of the latter with itself, according to universal laws of reason). (4) The subjective principle in judging the beautiful is represented as universal, i.e. as valid for every man, though not cognizable through any universal concept. (The objective principle of morality is also expounded as universal, i.e. for every subject and for every action of the same subject, and thus as cognizable by means of a universal concept.) Hence the moral judgment is not only susceptible of definite constitutive principles, but is possible only by grounding its maxims on these in their universality.

A reference to this analogy is usual even with the common understanding [of men], and we often describe beautiful objects of nature or art by names that seem to put a moral appreciation at their basis. We call buildings or trees majestic and magnificent, landscapes laughing and gay; even colors are called innocent, modest, tender, because they excite sensations which have something analogous to the consciousness of the state of mind brought about by moral judgments. Taste makes possible the transition, without any violent leap, from the charm of sense to habitual moral interest, as it represents the imagination in its freedom as capable of purposive determination for the understanding, and so teaches us to find even in objects of sense a free satisfaction apart from any charm of sense.

NOTES

1. If we have cause for supposing that concepts which we use as empirical principles stand in relationship with the pure cognitive faculty a priori, it is profitable, because of this reference, to seek for them a transcendental definition, i.e., a definition through pure categories, so far as these by themselves adequately furnish the distinction of the concept in question from others. We here follow the example of the mathematician, who leaves undetermined the empirical data of his problem and only brings their relation in their pure synthesis under the concepts of pure arithmetic, and thus generalizes the solution. Objection has been brought against a similar procedure of mine (cf. the Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason, Abbott's translation, p. 94), and my definition of the faculty of desire has been found fault with, viz., that it is [the being's] faculty of becoming, by means of its representations, the cause of the actuality of the objects of these representations; for the desires might be mere cravings, and by means of these alone everyone is convinced the object cannot be produced. But this proves nothing more than that there are desires in man, by which he is in contradiction with himself. For here he strives for the production of the object by means of the representation alone, from which he can expect no result, because he is conscious that his mechanical powers (if I may so call those which are not psychological), which must be determined by that representation to bring about the object (mediately), are either not competent or even tend toward what is impossible, e.g. to reverse the past (O mihi prae...
tertius . . . etc.) or to annihilate in the impatience of expectation the interval before the wished for moment. Although in such fantastic desires we are conscious of the inadequacy (or even the unsuitability) of our representations for being causes of their objects, yet their reference as causes, and consequently the representation of the causality, is contained in every wish; and this is peculiarly evident if the wish is an affection or longing. For these [longings], by their dilatation and contraction of the heart and consequent exhaustion of powers, prove that these powers are continually kept on the stretch by representations, but that they perpetually let the mind, having regard to the impossibility [of the desire], fall back in exhaustion. Even prayers [offered up] to avert great and (as far as one can see) unavoidable evils, and many superstitious means for attaining in a natural way impossible purposes, point to the casual reference of representations to their objects, a reference which cannot at all be checked by the consciousness of the inadequacy of the effort to produce the effect. As to why there should be in our nature this propensity to desires which are consciously vain, that is an anthropologico-teleological problem. It seems that, if we were not determined to the application of our powers before we were assured of the adequacy of our faculties to produce an object, these powers would remain in great part unused. For we commonly learn to know our powers only by first making trial of them. This deception in the case of vain wishes is then only the consequence of a benevolent ordinance in our nature. [This note was added by Kant in the Second Edition.]

2. The definition of “taste” which is laid down here is that it is the faculty of judging of the beautiful. But the analysis of judgments of taste must show what is required in order to call an object beautiful. The moments to which the judgment has regard in its reflection I have sought in accordance with the guidance of the logical functions of judgment (for in a judgment of taste a reference to the understanding is always involved). I have considered the moment of quality first because the aesthetical judgment upon the beautiful first pays attention to it.

3. A judgment upon an object of satisfaction may be quite disinterested, but yet very interesting i.e. not based upon an interest, but bringing an interest with it; of this kind are all pure moral judgments. Judgments of taste, however, do not in themselves establish any interest. Only in society is it interesting to have taste; the reason of this will be shown in the sequel.

4. [Second edition.]

5. An obligation to enjoyment is a manifest absurdity. Thus the obligation to all actions which have merely enjoyment for their aim can only be a pretended one, however spiritually it may be conceived (or decked out), even if it is a mystical, or so-called heavenly, enjoyment.

6. [Second edition.]

7. [Second edition.]

8. [Ueberweg points out (History of Philosophy, II, 528, English translation) that Mendelssohn had already called attention to the disinterestedness of our satisfaction in the beautiful. “It appears,” says Mendelssohn, “to be a particular mark of the beautiful, that it is contemplated with quiet satisfaction, that it pleases, even though it be not in our possession, and even though we be never so far removed from the desire to put it
to our use." But, of course, as Ueberweg remarks, Kant's conception of disinterestedness extends far beyond the idea of merely not desiring to possess the object.

9. [Second edition. Mr. Herbert Spencer expresses much more concisely what Kant has in his mind here. "Pleasure . . . is a feeling which we seek to bring into consciousness and retain there; pain is . . . a feeling which we seek to get out of consciousness and to keep out." *Principles of Psychology,* § 125.]

10. [The editions of Hartenstein and Kirchmann omit "ohne" before "Zweck," which makes havoc of the sentence. It is correctly printed by Rosenkranz.]

11. [Second edition.]

12. [Second edition.]

13. [Second edition.]

14. [Second edition.]

15. Models of taste as regards the arts of speech must be composed in a dead and learned language. The first in order that they may not suffer that change which inevitably comes over living languages, in which noble expressions become flat, common ones antiquated, and newly created ones have only a short circulation. The second because learned languages have a grammar which is subject to no wanton change of fashion, but the rules of which are preserved unchanged.

16. [This distinction between an *idea* and an *ideal*, as also the further contrast between ideals of the reason and ideals of the imagination, had already been given by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, "Dialectic," Bk. II, Ch. 3, § 1.]

17. [Polycletus of Argos flourished about 430 B.C. His statue of the "Spear-bearer" (*Doryphoros*), afterward became known as the "Canon," because in it the artist was supposed to have embodied a perfect representation of the ideal of the human figure.]

18. [This was a celebrated statue executed by Myron, a Greek sculptor, contemporary with Polycletus.]

19. It will be found that a perfectly regular countenance, such as a painter might wish to have for a model, ordinarily tells us nothing because it contains nothing characteristic, and therefore rather expresses the idea of the race than the specific [traits] of a person. The exaggeration of a characteristic of this kind, i.e. such as does violence to the normal idea (the purposiveness of the race), is called *caricature*. Experience also shows that these quite regular countenances commonly indicate internally only a mediocre man, presumably (if it may be assumed that external nature expresses the proportions of internal) because, if no mental disposition exceeds that proportion which is requisite in order to constitute a man free from faults, nothing can be expected of what is called *genius*, in which nature seems to depart from the ordinary relations of the mental powers on behalf of some special one.

20. It might be objected to this explanation that there are things in which we see a purposive form without cognizing any purpose in them, like the stone implements often gotten from old sepulchral tumuli with a hole in them, as if for a handle. These,
although they plainly indicate by their shape a purposiveness of which we do not know the purpose, are nevertheless not described as beautiful. But if we regard a thing as a work of art, that is enough to make us admit that its shape has reference to some design and definite purpose. And hence there is no immediate satisfaction in the contemplation of it. On the other hand a flower, e.g. a tulip, is regarded as beautiful, because in perceiving it we find a certain purposiveness which, in our judgment, is referred to no purpose at all.

21. [Second edition.]

22. [Second edition.]

23. [Second edition.]

24. [Second edition.]

25. [Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, "Methodology," Ch. I, § 1. "The construction of a concept is the a priori presentation of the corresponding intuition."]

26. [Charles Batteux (1713-1780), author of Les Beaux Arts reduits à un même principe.]

27. [Essay XVIII, "The Sceptic": "Critics can reason and dispute more plausibly than cooks or perfumers. We may observe, however, that this uniformity among human kind, hinders not, but that there is a considerable diversity in the sentiments of beauty and worth, and that education, custom, prejudice, caprice, and humour, frequently vary our taste of this kind. . . . Beauty and worth are merely of a relative nature, and consist in an agreeable sentiment, produced by an object in a particular mind, according to the peculiar structure and constitution of that mind." (In Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy, ed. Aiken, "Hafner Library of Classics" #3, 1948, pp. 338 ff.—Ed.)]

28. [For the distinction—an important one in Kant—between judgments of experience and judgments of perception, see his Prolegomena, § 18.]

29. [First edition has "limited."]

30. In order to be justified in claiming universal assent for an aesthetical judgment that rests merely on subjective grounds, it is sufficient to assume: (1) That the subjective conditions of the judgment, as regards the relation of the cognitive powers thus put into activity to a cognition in general, are the same in all men. This must be true, because otherwise men would not be able to communicate their representations or even their knowledge. (2) The judgment must merely have reference to this relation (consequently to the formal condition of the judgment) and be pure, i.e. not mingled either with concepts of the object or with sensations, as determining grounds. If there has been any mistake as regards this latter condition, then there is only an inaccurate application of the privilege, which a law gives us, to a particular case; but that does not destroy the privilege itself in general.

31. [Cf. Aristotle Poetis iv. 1448b: ha gar auta hylperos horomen, totoin tas eikonas tas malista epideomenvos chairomen theoroytes hion thieron ta morphas ton epirodoyn kai nekron. (Though the objects themselves may be painful to see, we delight to view the most realistic representations of them in art, the forms for example]
of the lowest animals and dead bodies.) Cf. also Rhetoric i. 11. 1371b; and Burke on the Sublime and Beautiful, Pt. I, § 16. Boileau L'art poétique, chant 3 makes a similar observation:

Il n'est point de serpent ni de monstre odieux
Qui, par l'art imité, ne puisse plaire aux yeux.
D'un pinceau délicat l'artifice agréable
Du plus affreux objet fait un objet aimable.]

32. [Second edition.]

33. [Cf. p. 158.]

34. [In English we would rather say "without soul," but I prefer to translate "Geist" consistently by "spirit," to avoid the confusion of it with "Seele."]

35. The intuitive in cognition must be opposed to the discursive (not to the symbolical). The former is either schematical, by demonstration, or symbolical, as a representation in accordance with a mere analogy.